Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 23 November 2009 at 4:15 pm.
IV—Kant's Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic
Version of Record online: 23 APR 2010
© 2010 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 110, Issue 1pt1, pages 47–75, April 2010
How to Cite
Allais, L. (2010), IV—Kant's Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 110: 47–75. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00279.x
- Issue online: 23 APR 2010
- Version of Record online: 23 APR 2010
This paper gives an interpretation of Kant's argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. I argue against a common way of reading this argument, which sees Kant as arguing that substantive a priori claims about mind-independent reality would be unintelligible because we cannot explain the source of their justification. I argue that Kant's concern with how synthetic a priori propositions are possible is not a concern with the source of their justification, but with how they can have objects. I argue that Kant's notion of intuition needs to be understood as a kind of representation which involves the presence to consciousness of the object it represents, and that this means that a priori intuition cannot present us with a mind-independent feature of reality.