Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 7 December 2009 at 4:15 pm.
V—Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence
Version of Record online: 23 APR 2010
© 2010 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 110, Issue 1pt1, pages 77–109, April 2010
How to Cite
Kennedy, M. (2010), V—Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 110: 77–109. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00280.x
- Issue online: 23 APR 2010
- Version of Record online: 23 APR 2010
I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs.