Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 8 February 2010 at 4:15 pm.
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VIII—Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth
Article first published online: 5 OCT 2010
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00283.x
© 2010 The Aristotelian Society
Issue
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 110, Issue 2pt2, pages 183–199, September 2010
Additional Information
How to Cite
Barker, S. (2010), VIII—Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 110: 183–199. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00283.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 5 OCT 2010
- Article first published online: 5 OCT 2010
- Abstract
- References
- Cited By
I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context of assertion V was bivalent. This theory requires a theory of assertion that is a form of cognitive expressivism.