Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 22 February 2010 at 4:15 pm.
IX—The Conceptual Problem of Other Bodies
Article first published online: 5 OCT 2010
© 2010 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 110, Issue 2pt2, pages 201–217, September 2010
How to Cite
Smith, J. (2010), IX—The Conceptual Problem of Other Bodies. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 110: 201–217. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00284.x
- Issue published online: 5 OCT 2010
- Article first published online: 5 OCT 2010
The, so called, ‘conceptual problem of other minds’ has been articulated in a number of different ways. I discuss two, drawing out some constraints on an adequate account of the grasp of concepts of mental states. Distinguishing between behaviour-based and identity-based approaches to the problem, I argue that the former, exemplified by Brewer and Pickard, are incomplete as they presuppose, but do not provide an answer to, what I shall call the conceptual problem of other bodies. I end with some remarks on identity-based approaches, pointing out related problems for versions of this approach held by Cassam and Peacocke.