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III—How Proper Names Refer
Article first published online: 30 AUG 2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00298.x
© 2011 The Aristotelian Society
Issue
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 111, Issue 1pt1, pages 43–78, April 2011
Additional Information
How to Cite
Dickie, I. (2011), III—How Proper Names Refer. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 111: 43–78. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00298.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 30 AUG 2011
- Article first published online: 30 AUG 2011
- Abstract
- References
- Cited By
This paper develops a new account of reference-fixing for proper names. The account is built around an intuitive claim about reference fixing: the claim that I am a participant in a practice of using α to refer to o only if my uses of α are constrained by the representationally relevant ways it is possible for o to behave. §I raises examples that suggest that a right account of how proper names refer should incorporate this claim. §II provides such an account.