Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 22 November 2010 at 4:15 p.m.
IV—Agency and Embodied Cognition
Article first published online: 30 AUG 2011
© 2011 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 111, Issue 1pt1, pages 79–95, April 2011
How to Cite
Romdenh-Romluc, K. (2011), IV—Agency and Embodied Cognition. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 111: 79–95. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00299.x
- Issue published online: 30 AUG 2011
- Article first published online: 30 AUG 2011
The dominant account of agency takes actions to be brought about and guided by intentions that represent the agent's performance of the action. Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative view that denies intentions are essential for action. He holds instead that the agent's activity is brought about by her apprehension of her environment, without the need for any intervening thoughts that represent her performance of it. I argue that two considerations advanced in favour of the thesis that human cognition is embodied are in tension with the dominant account of agency, and speak in favour of Merleau-Ponty's view.