Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 6 December 2010 at 4:15 p.m.
V—Moral Truth: Observational or Theoretical?
Article first published online: 30 AUG 2011
© 2011 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 111, Issue 1pt1, pages 97–114, April 2011
How to Cite
Wilson, C. (2011), V—Moral Truth: Observational or Theoretical?. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 111: 97–114. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00300.x
- Issue published online: 30 AUG 2011
- Article first published online: 30 AUG 2011
Moral properties are widely held to be response-dependent properties of actions, situations, events and persons. There is controversy as to whether the putative response-dependence of these properties nullifies any truth-claims for moral judgements, or rather supports them. The present paper argues that moral judgements are more profitably compared with theoretical judgements in the natural sciences than with the judgements of immediate sense-perception. The notion of moral truth is dependent on the notion of moral knowledge, which in turn is best understood as a possible endpoint of theory change for the better.