Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 9 May 2011 at 4:15 p.m.
XI—Intention and the Self
Version of Record online: 23 DEC 2011
© 2011 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 111, Issue 3pt3, pages 325–351, October 2011
How to Cite
Madden, R. (2011), XI—Intention and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 111: 325–351. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00313.x
- Issue online: 23 DEC 2011
- Version of Record online: 23 DEC 2011
Does intention presuppose personal identity, and what relevance does the issue have for the contemporary personal identity debate? I distinguish three ways in which intention might be said to presuppose personal identity, focusing mainly on causal presupposition and content presupposition. I argue that intention often causally presupposes personal identity. I argue that intention does not content-presuppose personal identity. The former result is a potential basis for a Butlerian circularity objection to Lockean theories of personal identity. The latter result undercuts a prominent Lockean reply to ‘the thinking animal’ objection which has recently supplanted traditional Butlerian circularity objections in the personal identity debate.