Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 6 June 2011 at 4:15 p.m.
XIV—Reasons for Action
Version of Record online: 23 DEC 2011
© 2011 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 111, Issue 3pt3, pages 407–427, October 2011
How to Cite
Hieronymi, P. (2011), XIV—Reasons for Action. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 111: 407–427. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00316.x
- Issue online: 23 DEC 2011
- Version of Record online: 23 DEC 2011
Donald Davidson opens ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ by asking, ‘What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?’ His answer has generated some confusion about reasons for action and made for some difficulty in understanding the place for the agent's own reasons for acting, in the explanation of an action. I offer here a different account of the explanation of action, one that, though minimal and formal, preserves the proper role for the agent's own reasons for acting.