Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 10 October 2011 at 4:15 p.m.
Article first published online: 13 JUL 2012
© 2012 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 112, Issue 1pt1, pages 1–28, April 2012
How to Cite
McGinn, M. (2012), I—Non-Inferential Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 112: 1–28. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00323.x
- Issue published online: 13 JUL 2012
- Article first published online: 13 JUL 2012
This paper looks at statements I am in a position to make ‘straight off’: observational judgements, perceptual and memory statements, statements about my posture, my intentions, and so on. These kinds of statement pose a problem: what is the nature of my entitlement to them? I focus on observational judgements and on two contrasting approaches to them. The first, which I reject, provides an account of my warrant for them; the second, which I defend, disconnects my entitlement from possession of a justification. I consider what light the second approach sheds on the other kinds of statements I am in a position to make straight off.