Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 24 October 2011 at 4:15 p.m.
II—Direct Realism and Immediate Justification
Version of Record online: 13 JUL 2012
© 2012 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 112, Issue 1pt1, pages 29–44, April 2012
How to Cite
Soldati, G. (2012), II—Direct Realism and Immediate Justification. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 112: 29–44. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00324.x
- Issue online: 13 JUL 2012
- Version of Record online: 13 JUL 2012
Direct realism with respect to perceptual experiences has two facets, an epistemological one and a metaphysical one. From the epistemological point of view it involves the claim that perceptual experiences provide immediate justification. From the metaphysical point of view it involves the claim that in perceptual experience we enter into direct contact with items in the external world. In a more radical formulation, often associated with naive realism, the metaphysical conception of direct realism involves the idea that perceptual experiences depend on the items in the external world they are related to. This paper describes a simple account that makes room for immediate justification provided by perceptual experience. The simple account establishes an explanatory relation between the justificatory role of a perceptual experience and the fact that such an experience provides a reason for a belief. The account is evaluated in the light of some objections. Different ways to react to those objections are discussed. It will appear that in order to preserve the explanatory relation established by the simple account, one has to accept naive realism. By breaking the connection between reason and justification, on the other side, one jeopardizes the possibility for perceptual experience to deliver immediate justification.