Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 9 January 2012 at 4:15 p.m.
Version of Record online: 11 OCT 2012
© 2012 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 112, Issue 2pt2, pages 123–160, July 2012
How to Cite
Yalcin, S. (2012), VI—Bayesian Expressivism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 112: 123–160. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00329.x
- Issue online: 11 OCT 2012
- Version of Record online: 11 OCT 2012
I develop a conception of expressivism according to which it is chiefly a pragmatic thesis about some fragment of discourse, one imposing certain constraints on semantics. The first half of the paper uses credal expressivism about the language of probability as a stalking-horse for this purpose. The second half turns to the question of how one might frame an analogous form of expressivism about the language of deontic modality. Here I offer a preliminary comparison of two expressivist lines. The first, expectation expressivism, looks again to Bayesian modelling for inspiration: it glosses deontically modal language as characteristically serving to express decision-theoretic expectation (expected utility). The second, plan expressivism, develops the idea (due to Gibbard 2003) that this language serves to express ‘plan-laden’ states of belief. In the process of comparing the views, I show how to incorporate Gibbard's modelling ideas into a compositional semantics for attitudes and modals, filling a lacuna in the account. I close with the question whether and how plan expressivism might be developed with expectation-like structure.