XII—Leibniz's Law and the Philosophy of Mind

Authors

  • Frank Jackson

    1. School of Philosophy, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia
    2. School of Humanities and Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Bundoora, VIC 3086, Australia
    3. Department of Philosophy, 1879 Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544-1006, USA, fcjack321@gmail.com
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  • Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 14 May 2012 at 4:15 p.m.

Abstract

We draw some metaphysical conclusions about colour and belief from some epistemological commonplaces. It turns out that this requires us to challenge orthodoxy on the causal efficacy of mental properties and to rewrite the standard argument against dualism, but in a way which is good news for functionalists about the mind.

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