A SCIENTIFIC STANDARD AND AN AGENCY’S LEGAL INDEPENDENCE: WHICH OF THESE REPUTATION PROTECTION MECHANISMS IS LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO POLITICAL MOVES?
Version of Record online: 12 OCT 2007
© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Volume 85, Issue 4, pages 961–978, December 2007
How to Cite
MAOR, M. (2007), A SCIENTIFIC STANDARD AND AN AGENCY’S LEGAL INDEPENDENCE: WHICH OF THESE REPUTATION PROTECTION MECHANISMS IS LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO POLITICAL MOVES?. Public Administration, 85: 961–978. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00676.x
- Issue online: 12 OCT 2007
- Version of Record online: 12 OCT 2007
- Date received 16 July 2005. Date accepted 17 April 2006.
This article presents a model that introduces a scientific ‘gold’ standard as a reputation protection mechanism operating alongside an agency’s legal independence. It tries to gauge which of the two is less susceptible to political moves. The model suggests that the scientific ‘gold’ standard for agency decisions is less susceptible to political moves because of its important role as a legitimating device for both government ministers and regulators. Government ministers are able to address multiple audiences and even to respond to aggressive strategies by powerful interest groups by undermining one reputation protection mechanism (that is, an agency’s independence) without weakening the other (that is, the scientific barrier for granting full-subsidy status to treatments that lack comparative therapeutic advantage). This implies that drug reimbursement mechanisms that provide a high quality of drug evaluation are designed to be effective.