Version of Record online: 27 OCT 2006
Volume 7, Issue 2, pages 164–182, December 1994
How to Cite
Wilkerson, T. E. (1994), AKRASIA. Ratio, 7: 164–182. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00062.x
- Issue online: 27 OCT 2006
- Version of Record online: 27 OCT 2006
- Cited By
Aristotle's account of akrasia is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, his account of the problem is coloured by a number of unattractive assumptions and preoccupations; second, his central claim, that akrasia involves a temporary displacement of knowledge, deals at best with only a small number of cases; third, he is wrong to suppose that the akrates is typically someone overwhelmed by passion. We need to follow Davidson in recognising that the central problem consists in a failure to convert intention into action. Any solution must involve a recognition that we are dealing with a range of very different kinds of case, which demand different kinds of treatment. For example sometimes agents are overtaken by passion; sometimes they coolly and calmly do the wrong thing; sometimes they are insincere; sometimes they are suffering from a weakness of will; sometimes they are guilty of some kind of self deception; and sometimes they may have difficulty in comparing the goods and evils available.