RULE-FOLLOWING WITHOUT REASONS: WITTGENSTEIN'S QUIETISM AND THE CONSTITUTIVE QUESTION
Article first published online: 22 NOV 2007
Volume 20, Issue 4, pages 481–502, December 2007
How to Cite
Wright, C. (2007), RULE-FOLLOWING WITHOUT REASONS: WITTGENSTEIN'S QUIETISM AND THE CONSTITUTIVE QUESTION. Ratio, 20: 481–502. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00379.x
- Issue published online: 22 NOV 2007
- Article first published online: 22 NOV 2007
This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,1 hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct (though connected) issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, ‘the Rule-following Considerations’.2 Let me begin by explaining my focus here.