Deontic Logic as Logic of Legal Norms: Two Main Sources of Problems
Article first published online: 2 AUG 2007
Volume 4, Issue 3, pages 374–392, December 1991
How to Cite
MAZZARESE, T. (1991), Deontic Logic as Logic of Legal Norms: Two Main Sources of Problems. Ratio Juris, 4: 374–392. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00107.x
- Issue published online: 2 AUG 2007
- Article first published online: 2 AUG 2007
The paper offers a critical survey of two main sorts of problems hindering the possibility of conceiving deontic logic as a suitable account of the logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of “legal norm” is viewed as the main source of the first sort of problems: (a) the typological variety of legal norms requires an account both of the differing logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) differing legal norms, and of the relations which might hold amon them; (b) the ontologic, semantic, and epistemic features of legal norms shed doubt on the very attempt to figure out a logical analysis of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of “systemic legal validity” is viewed as the main source of the second sort of problems: Deontic logic does not provide suitable logical tools to account for legal phenomena like enactment, derogation, and conflicts between legal norms which rely on systemic legal validity.