I am grateful to Stanley L. Paulson for his careful reading and many helpful comments. I have learnt a great deal from his constructive criticisms. I should also like to thank Nigel Simmonds, with whom I discussed the ideas underlying this paper many times, as well as Emran Mian, whose “critical friendship” was, and still is, invaluable.
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Hart's and Kelsen's Concepts of Normativity Contrasted†
Article first published online: 23 NOV 2004
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2004.00280.x
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How to Cite
DELACROIX, S. (2004), Hart's and Kelsen's Concepts of Normativity Contrasted. Ratio Juris, 17: 501–520. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2004.00280.x
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Publication History
- Issue published online: 23 NOV 2004
- Article first published online: 23 NOV 2004
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Abstract. Hart's and Kelsen's respective outlooks on the concept of normativity not only differ by the way they explain this concept but also, more importantly, in what they seek to achieve when endeavouring to account for the normative dimension of law. By examining Hart's and Kelsen's models in the light of Korsgaard's understanding of the “normativity problem,” my aim is to emphasise not only their contrasted perspectives, but also the common limit they impose on their theories by dismissing as inappropriate any question regarding the emergence of legal normativity. On the basis of my previous arguments, I shall explain why I deem Raz's analysis of the contrast between Hart's and Kelsen's conceptions of normativity to be misleading.