The research for this paper was made possible by a Postdoctoral Fellowship of the Fund for Scientific Research Flanders. I would like to thank Gordon Finlayson, Pablo Gilabert and an anonymous referee for many helpful remarks on an earlier version of the paper.
Democratic Deliberation as the Open-Ended Construction of Justice
Version of Record online: 3 AUG 2007
Volume 20, Issue 3, pages 335–354, September 2007
How to Cite
RUMMENS, S. (2007), Democratic Deliberation as the Open-Ended Construction of Justice. Ratio Juris, 20: 335–354. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2007.00364.x
- Issue online: 3 AUG 2007
- Version of Record online: 3 AUG 2007
Abstract. An analysis of the epistemological structure of democratic deliberation as a procedure in which legal norms are constructed reveals that deliberation combines procedural and substantive aspects in a unique and inextricable manner. The co-original recognition of the private and public autonomy of all citizens provides the substantive critical standard against which the justice of norms is measured. At the same time, such recognition requires that the particular needs and values of all people concerned be taken into account. Given the privileged epistemic access people have to their own particular perspective, this requirement implies the ineliminability of actual deliberative procedures. The open-ended nature of these constructive procedures is partly due to the fact that the rules of the procedure are counterfactual and themselves subject to interpretation. More importantly, it also reflects the historical nature of our human world and the freedom of moral persons to shape and reshape their preferences.