For comments on drafts of this article, my thanks to Brian Bix, Charles Collier, Ken Ehrenberg, Kim Ferzan, Rashad Ibanov, Hans Oberdiek, John Oberdiek, Ralf Poscher, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaca, and Jefferson White. I thank my research assistant, Anna Södersten, for her assistance with this article.
Alexy on Necessity in Law and Morals*
Version of Record online: 22 FEB 2012
© 2012 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Volume 25, Issue 1, pages 47–58, March 2012
How to Cite
PATTERSON, D. (2012), Alexy on Necessity in Law and Morals. Ratio Juris, 25: 47–58. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2011.00502.x
- Issue online: 22 FEB 2012
- Version of Record online: 22 FEB 2012
Robert Alexy has built his original theory of law upon pervasive claims for “necessary” features of law. In this article, I show that Alexy's claims suffer from two difficulties. First, Alexy is never clear about what he means by “necessity.” Second, Alexy writes as if there have been no challenges to claims of conceptual necessity. There have been such challenges and Alexy needs to answer them if his project is to succeed.