Fabrizio Macagno would like to thank the Fundação para a Ciência ea Tecnologia for the research grant on Argumentation, Communication and Context (PTDC/FIL-FIL/110117/2009) and the international law firm Martinez & Novebaci for providing materials and consultancy that proved to be extremely helpful for the research in this paper.
Presumptions in Legal Argumentation
Version of Record online: 3 AUG 2012
© 2012 The Authors. Ratio Juris © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Volume 25, Issue 3, pages 271–300, September 2012
How to Cite
MACAGNO, F. and WALTON, D. (2012), Presumptions in Legal Argumentation. Ratio Juris, 25: 271–300. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2012.00514.x
- Issue online: 3 AUG 2012
- Version of Record online: 3 AUG 2012
In this paper a theoretical definition that helps to explain how the logical structure of legal presumptions is constructed by applying the Carneades model of argumentation developed in artificial intelligence. Using this model, it is shown how presumptions work as devices used in evidentiary reasoning in law in the event of a lack of evidence to assist a chain of reasoning to move forward to prove or disprove a claim. It is shown how presumptions work as practical devices that may be useful in cases in which there is insufficient evidence to prove the claim to an appropriate standard of proof.