We would like to thank Sarantis Kalyvitis for very productive discussions and suggestions that inspired the undertaking of this project. We would also like to thank the CESifo–Delphi 2006 conference participants for useful comments and suggestions. The authors are solely responsible for any possible remaining errors.
The Growth Effects of National Patent Policies*
Article first published online: 8 MAY 2008
© 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Review of International Economics
Volume 16, Issue 3, pages 499–515, August 2008
How to Cite
Dinopoulos, E. and Kottaridi, C. (2008), The Growth Effects of National Patent Policies. Review of International Economics, 16: 499–515. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00742.x
- Issue published online: 8 JUL 2008
- Article first published online: 8 MAY 2008
We construct a two-country (innovative North and imitating South) model of product-cycle trade, fully endogenous Schumpeterian growth, and national patent policies. A move towards harmonization based on stronger Southern intellectual property rights (IPR) protection accelerates the long-run global rates of innovation and growth, reduces the North–South wage gap, and has an ambiguous effect on the rate of international technology transfer. Patent harmonization constitutes a suboptimal global-growth policy. However, if the global economy is governed by a common patent policy regime, then stronger global IPR protection: (a) increases the rates of global innovation and growth; (b) accelerates the rate of international technology transfer; and (c) has no impact on the North–South wage gap.