We are grateful to the Russell Sage Foundation for having financed this project. We thank Woojin Lee for his advice on econometric issues. We are also grateful to the Danish Statistical Archive for providing us with the Danish election studies. The project originated while Van der Straeten was visiting Yale University; financial support for her stay from the Department of Economics and the Cowles Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
The Political Economy of Xenophobia and Distribution: The Case of Denmark*
Article first published online: 31 JUL 2006
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Volume 108, Issue 2, pages 251–277, July 2006
How to Cite
Roemer, J. E. and Van der Straeten, K. (2006), The Political Economy of Xenophobia and Distribution: The Case of Denmark. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108: 251–277. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00450.x
- Issue published online: 31 JUL 2006
- Article first published online: 31 JUL 2006
- First version submitted November 2004; final version received September 2005.
- Political equilibrium;
For the first time in some years, a conservative government came to power in Denmark in 2001, due primarily to the citizenry's disaffection with social-democratic policies on immigration. We represent political competition in Denmark as taking place over two issues—the size of the public sector and immigration—and model political equilibrium using the party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) concept, which generates equilibria on multi-dimensional policy spaces where parties form endogenously. By fitting the model to Danish data, we argue that citizen xenophobia may be expected to decrease the size of the Danish public sector by an amount between 12% and 36% of one standard deviation of the probability distribution of citizens' ideal points of the size of the public sector.