I would like to thank Bernd Fitzenberger, Alfred Garloff, Julia Lane, Michael Maier, Friedhelm Pfeiffer and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. I am also grateful to the IAB, Nuremberg, and especially Peter Jacobebbinghaus for assistance with the data. Financial support from the German Science Foundation (Grant-No. PF 331/3-1/2) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
Rent-sharing and Collective Bargaining Coverage: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data
Article first published online: 28 APR 2009
© The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2009.
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Volume 111, Issue 2, pages 323–349, June 2009
How to Cite
Guertzgen, N. (2009), Rent-sharing and Collective Bargaining Coverage: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 111: 323–349. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2009.01566.x
- Issue published online: 28 APR 2009
- Article first published online: 28 APR 2009
- First version submitted January 2007;final version received December 2008.
- linked employer–employee data
Using a linked employer–employee dataset, this paper analyses the relationship between firm profitability and wages. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector- and firm-specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. Our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm-specific quasi-rents in the non-union sector and under firm-specific contracts. Industry-wide wage contracts, however, are associated with a significantly lower responsiveness of wages to firm-level profitability.