Entrepreneurship, Financiership, and Selection


  • We thank Annette Boom, Guido Friebel, Ari Hyytinen, Leo Kaas, Christian Keuschnigg, Klaus Kultti, Topi Miettinen, J-P. Niinimäki, J-C. Rochet, Rune Stenbacka, Jean Tirole, Ákos Valentinyi, Timo Vesala, Juuso Välimäki, the participants of numerous seminars, and an anonymous referee for comments. We also thank Tekes and the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation for financial support.


We develop an equilibrium model of the market for entrepreneurial finance, in which all agents have some personal wealth and a project whose quality is their private information. All agents choose whether to invest either as entrepreneurs or financiers, or to invest in storage technology. We find that a binding economy-level wealth constraint, which renders credit scarce, can create advantageous selection, where productive agents become entrepreneurs and unproductive agents become their financiers. If funding is easier to obtain, entrepreneurship also attracts unproductive agents. In our model, individual wealth and entrepreneurship are positively (negatively) correlated if financial market participation is complete (incomplete).