I would like to acknowledge Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez for extremely helpful discussions. I thank Francisco Candel, Matthias Dahm, Fabrizio Germano, Francisco Martínez, Socorro Puy, Antonio Quesada, Ángel Solano, two anonymous referees, and various audiences for their opinions. I am grateful to the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (SEJ2007-67580-C02-02) and the Junta de Andalucía (SEJ2007-2986) for financial support. The usual disclaimer applies.
Screening and Signaling in Communication†
Article first published online: 16 MAR 2012
© The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2012.
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Volume 114, Issue 2, pages 480–499, June 2012
How to Cite
Andina-Díaz, A. (2012), Screening and Signaling in Communication. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 114: 480–499. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01687.x
- Issue published online: 15 MAY 2012
- Article first published online: 16 MAR 2012
- First version submitted September 2009; Final version received July 2010.
- two-sided incomplete information
In this paper, we analyze a model of repeated strategic communication between a sender and a receiver. The sender has private information on a policy-relevant variable but does not know the receiver's motives. Together with the desire of the sender to please the receiver and the desire of the receiver to be pleased, the two-sided incomplete information creates an interesting communication problem in which players can choose to use information strategically. We analyze various modes of communication, which allow for information transmission, and we compare them in terms of both the quality of the policy implemented and the welfare of the players.