Reconciling Archer and Bourdieu in an Emergentist Theory of Action*

Authors


  • *

    I would like to thank Margaret Archer, Diana Coole, Jason Edwards, Frédéric Vandenberghe, and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of the material in this article. Address correspondence to: Dave Elder-Vass, Department of Sociology, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom. Tel.: +44-1206-873544; E-mail: d.eldervass@ntlworld.com.

Abstract

Margaret Archer and Pierre Bourdieu have advanced what seem at first sight to be incompatible theories of human agency. While Archer places heavy stress on conscious reflexive deliberation and the consequent choices of identity and projects that individuals make, Bourdieu's concept of habitus places equally heavy stress on the role of social conditioning in determining our behavior, and downplays the contribution of conscious deliberation. Despite this, I argue that these two approaches, with some modification, can be reconciled in a single emergentist theory of human action that is sketched out in this article. It examines how human dispositions and our reflexive decisions are related to the determination of human action, linking dispositions and decisions to their neural base in human physiology and to the social factors that influence them. As a result, it argues, we can see human action as the outcome of a continuous interaction between dispositions and reflexivity. The article goes on to relate this explanation back to Bourdieu's concept of the habitus and Archer's account of reflexivity. It argues that the weaknesses in Bourdieu's theory of action can be resolved by a reasonable reinterpretation of the habitus that makes it consistent with the emergentist theory and creates space for human choices as well as social influences on our behavior. This opens up a role for the sort of reflexive deliberations advocated by Archer and thus to a reconciliation of the key contributions of both Archer and Bourdieu.

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