This article is based on a paper that Schechtman presented at the Forty-First Annual Conference of the Institute for Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS), “Knowledge Most Worth Having in the Decade of the Brain,” at Star Island, New Hampshire, 30 July-6 August 1994.
THE STORY OF THE MIND: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
Version of Record online: 15 DEC 2005
Volume 31, Issue 4, pages 597–614, December 1996
How to Cite
Schechtman, M. (1996), THE STORY OF THE MIND: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR. Zygon, 31: 597–614. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9744.1996.tb00952.x
- Issue online: 15 DEC 2005
- Version of Record online: 15 DEC 2005
- philosophy of mind;
Abstract. Persons have a curious dual nature. On the one hand, they are subjects, whose actions must be explained in terms of beliefs, desires, plans, and goals. At the same time, however, they also are physical objects, whose actions must be explicable in terms of physical laws. So far no satisfying account of this duality has been offered. Both Cartesian dualism and the modern materialist alternatives (reductionist and antireductionist) have failed to capture the full range of our experience of persons. I argue that an exciting new approach to this difficulty can be found by considering developments in clinical psychology. The clinical debate between those endorsing biological models of mental illness and those endorsing psychodynamic models mirrors broader debates in the philosophy of mind. The possible resolution of this debate through the development of integrated psychobiological models suggests a promising way to reconcile the dual nature of persons in a far more appealing way than any yet proposed.