• consciousness;
  • cyborg;
  • Donna Haraway;
  • human-machine;
  • influence of ultimate beliefs;
  • information;
  • methodological naturalism;
  • ontology;
  • origin;
  • philosophy of mind;
  • physicalism;
  • technology

Abstract. The idea of cyborg often is taken as a token for the distinction between human and machine having become irrelevant. In this essay I argue against that view. I critically analyze empirical arguments, theoretical reflections, and ultimate convictions that are supposed to support the idea. I show that empirical arguments at this time rather point in a different direction and that theoretical views behind it are at least questionable. I also show that the ultimate convictions presupposed deny basic tenets of traditional Christianity, while their claim to be based on science confuses scientific results with their interpretation on the basis of a naturalistic world-view.