John Duggan, Department of Political Science, and Department of Economics, University of Rochester (firstname.lastname@example.org). Yoji Sekiya, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester.
Voting Equilibria in Multi-candidate Elections
Version of Record online: 10 NOV 2009
© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume 11, Issue 6, pages 875–889, December 2009
How to Cite
DUGGAN, J. and SEKIYA, Y. (2009), Voting Equilibria in Multi-candidate Elections. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11: 875–889. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01433.x
- Issue online: 10 NOV 2009
- Version of Record online: 10 NOV 2009
- Received February 12, 2008; Accepted June 27, 2009.
We consider a general plurality voting game with multiple candidates, where voter preferences over candidates are exogenously given. In particular, we allow for arbitrary voter indifferences, as may arise in voting subgames of citizen-candidate or locational models of elections. We prove that the voting game admits pure strategy equilibria in undominated strategies. The proof is constructive: we exhibit an algorithm, the “best winning deviation” algorithm, that produces such an equilibrium in finite time. A byproduct of the algorithm is a simple story for how voters might learn to coordinate on such an equilibrium.