Klaus Kultti, Department of Economics, Arkadiankatu 7, FIN-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland (firstname.lastname@example.org). Paavo Miettinen, Bank of Finland, Snellmaninaukio (PO Box 160), FIN-00101, Helsinki, Finland (email@example.com).
Stability of Constitutions
Version of Record online: 10 NOV 2009
© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume 11, Issue 6, pages 891–896, December 2009
How to Cite
KULTTI, K. and MIETTINEN, P. (2009), Stability of Constitutions. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11: 891–896. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01434.x
We thank the Associate Editor and the Referee for very good suggestions that significantly improved the paper. Miettinen gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Finish Doctoral Programme in Economics and Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation.
- Issue online: 10 NOV 2009
- Version of Record online: 10 NOV 2009
- Received November 16, 2006; Accepted February 12, 2008.
Constitution is a pair of rules (s, S) that are used in a voting situation. The rule s is used to vote about the existing alternatives and the rule S is used to vote about changing the rule s to some other rule s′. We consider what kind of constitutions are likely to emerge as prominent ones if the constitutions contain more than just two rules. In a constitution that contains any number of rules the nth rule is used to decide about the n − 1 th rule. We define a notion of stability for the constitutions and show that all stable constitutions roughly contain the same rule from n = 2 onwards. This is one explanation to the casual observation that the constitutions have usually only two rules.