Richard Cornes holds the F. H. Gruen Chair in Economics at the Australian National University. We are grateful to Indraneel Dasgupta, Albert Schweinberger, Jun Iritani, and Toshihiro Ihori for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Dasgupta and Kanbur (2005) have independently explored properties of models with many public goods. The usual disclaimer applies.
On the Private Provision of Two or More Public Goods
Version of Record online: 28 MAR 2010
© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume 12, Issue 2, pages 363–385, April 2010
How to Cite
CORNES, R. and ITAYA, J.-I. (2010), On the Private Provision of Two or More Public Goods. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12: 363–385. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01455.x
- Issue online: 28 MAR 2010
- Version of Record online: 28 MAR 2010
- Received September 6, 2006; Accepted August 19, 2009.
We extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision to allow for two or more public goods, and explore the new possibilities that arise in this setting. We show that, when there are many public goods, voluntary contribution equilibrium typically generates, not only too low a level of public good provision, but also the wrong mix of public goods. We also analyze the neutrality property in the more general setting, and extend a neutrality proposition of Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986).