Public Goods, Social Norms, and Naïve Beliefs
Article first published online: 28 MAR 2010
© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume 12, Issue 2, pages 199–223, April 2010
How to Cite
CARTWRIGHT, E. and PATEL, A. (2010), Public Goods, Social Norms, and Naïve Beliefs. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12: 199–223. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01457.x
- Issue published online: 28 MAR 2010
- Article first published online: 28 MAR 2010
- Received November 27, 2007; Accepted September 13, 2009.
An individual's contribution to a public good may be seen by others as a signal of attributes such as generosity or wealth. An individual may, therefore, choose their contribution so as to send an appropriate signal to others. In this paper, we question how the inferences made by others will influence the amount contributed to the public good. Evidence suggests that individuals are naïve and biased toward taking things at “face value.” We contrast, therefore, contributions made to a public good if others are expected to make rational inferences versus contributions if others are expected to make naïve inferences.