Edward Cartwright, Department of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP. UK. (E.J.Cartwright@kent.ac.uk) and Amrish Patel, Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30, Gothenburg, Sweden (firstname.lastname@example.org).
Imitation and the Incentive to Contribute Early in a Sequential Public Good Game
Article first published online: 19 JUL 2010
© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume 12, Issue 4, pages 691–708, August 2010
How to Cite
CARTWRIGHT, E. and PATEL, A. (2010), Imitation and the Incentive to Contribute Early in a Sequential Public Good Game. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12: 691–708. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01470.x
The authors are indebted to two anonymous referees and the associate editor, Ted Bergstrom, for many helpful comments, particularly in improving the Proof of Lemma 1. Edward Cartwright also acknowledges the support of ESRC Grant RES-000-22-1999, “Why some people choose to be leaders.” Amrish Patel also acknowledges the support of a Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius postdoctoral research fellowship.
- Issue published online: 19 JUL 2010
- Article first published online: 19 JUL 2010
- Received August 5, 2008; Accepted May 18, 2009.