Michel Mougeot and Florence Naegelen, CRESE University of Franche-Comte, Avenue de l’Observatoire Besançon 25030 cedex, France (firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com). Benjamin Pelloux and Jean-Louis Rullière, GATE, CNRS and University of Lyon, 93 chemin des Mouilles, 69130 Ecully, France (firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com). Benjamin Pelloux, CREED, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands (firstname.lastname@example.org).
Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Markets
Article first published online: 26 SEP 2011
© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume 13, Issue 5, pages 829–856, October 2011
How to Cite
MOUGEOT, M., NAEGELEN, F., PELLOUX, B. and RULLIÈRE, J.-L. (2011), Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Markets. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 13: 829–856. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01521.x
This research has been made possible by a financial support from the Mission Climat, Caisse des Dépôts, Paris, France. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Mission Climat, Caisse des Dépôts. The authors are grateful to Anaïs Delbosc, Sylvain Boschetto, Sylvain Ferriol for the software and the technical assistance. They thank Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt, participants of the ESA 2009 American meeting in Tucson, two anonymous referees, and the editor of this review for their helpful comments. The remaining errors are the authors’ sole responsibility.
- Issue published online: 26 SEP 2011
- Article first published online: 26 SEP 2011
- Received December 17, 2009; Accepted February 28, 2011.
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