Tetsuro Mizoguchi, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Reitaku University, 2–1-1, Hikarigaoka, Kashiwa-shi, Chiba 277-8686 (email@example.com). Nguyen Van Quyen, University of Ottawa, 55 Laurier Avenue East, Desmarais Building, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1N 6N5 (firstname.lastname@example.org).
Amakudari: The Post-Retirement Employment of Elite Bureaucrats in Japan
Version of Record online: 3 SEP 2012
© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume 14, Issue 5, pages 813–847, October 2012
How to Cite
MIZOGUCHI, T. and VAN QUYEN, N. (2012), Amakudari: The Post-Retirement Employment of Elite Bureaucrats in Japan. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 14: 813–847. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2012.01563.x
We are very grateful to the editor, the associate editor, and two anonymous referees for their comments.
- Issue online: 3 SEP 2012
- Version of Record online: 3 SEP 2012
- Received September 30, 2009; Accepted February 9, 2011.
This paper analyzes the amakudari practice in Japan. Amakudari refers to a process in which government agencies contact the private firms that they regulate, asking them to provide employment for their retiring elite bureaucrats. Upon employment at the private firms, bureaucrats may collude with their former colleagues in the ministries they worked for to secure lucrative government contracts, avoid regulatory inspections, or obtain preferential treatment for their new employers. This paper provides an explicit formalization of the implicit collusion between the regulator and the regulated.