*The inspiration for this volume was provided by a weekly colloquium concerning administrative law and decision-making organized by Andre Hoekema, University of Amsterdam and Erhard Blankenburg, Free University, Amsterdam, in the Spring of 1987. The opportunity to attend those sessions, and support for the writing of an earlier version of this article, was provided by the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Study. A still earlier version was prepared during a residency at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford University.
Editor's Introduction: Understanding Regulatory Enforcement
Article first published online: 28 JUN 2008
Law & Policy
Volume 11, Issue 2, pages 89–119, April 1989
How to Cite
KAGAN, R. A. (1989), Editor's Introduction: Understanding Regulatory Enforcement. Law & Policy, 11: 89–119. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9930.1989.tb00022.x
ROBERT A. KAGAN is Professor of Political Science and Law at the University of California, Berkeley. Author of numerous books and articles on regulatory agencies and courts, his current research concerns cross-national differences in labor law, environmental law, and liability law as they affect the operation of seaports and intermodal transportation.
- Issue published online: 28 JUN 2008
- Article first published online: 28 JUN 2008
This issue of Law & Policy adds to the growing body of empirical case studies of decision-making and enforcement in regulatory agencies. Summarizing that research, regulatory enforcement styles can be described in terms of two dimensions, one concerning the ways in which regulatory violations are defined and punished, the other concerning outcomes, described in policy-evaluative terms. In explaining variation in enforcement style, existing studies point to three sets of factors: characteristics of the regulatory “legal design”; features of agencies' “task environment”; and the regulatory “political environment.” Weighting the relative importance of these factors, however, is difficult because of the number and fluidity of variables and the adaptiveness of regulatory agencies.