I wish to thank Valerie Hans, Lars Noah, as well as participants in faculty workshops at Florida State University College of Law and University of Houston Law Center.
A Norms Approach to Jury “Nullification:” Interests, Values, and Scripts
Article first published online: 16 JAN 2008
© 2008 The Author
Law & Policy
Volume 30, Issue 1, pages 12–45, January 2008
How to Cite
SANDERS, J. (2008), A Norms Approach to Jury “Nullification:” Interests, Values, and Scripts. Law & Policy, 30: 12–45. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9930.2008.00268.x
- Issue published online: 16 JAN 2008
- Article first published online: 16 JAN 2008
Juries and other lay tribunals are often justified because they leaven the law with community norms. Unfortunately, we do not have a particularly good theory of when and how juries substitute their normative judgments for the law. A first step in developing such a theory is to examine the nature of norms and the way jurors bring normative judgments to their task. In this article I compare and contrast different understandings of norms that currently are in vogue in the social sciences and then use these approaches to develop a more systematic understanding of when juries do and when they do not substitute their normative judgment for that of the law.