Manuscript received 15.8.06; final version received 30.6.07.
DO ABATEMENT QUOTAS LEAD TO MORE SUCCESSFUL CLIMATE COALITIONS?*
Article first published online: 21 DEC 2007
The Manchester School
Volume 76, Issue 1, pages 104–129, January 2008
How to Cite
ALTAMIRANO-CABRERA, J.-C., FINUS, M. and DELLINK, R. (2008), DO ABATEMENT QUOTAS LEAD TO MORE SUCCESSFUL CLIMATE COALITIONS?. The Manchester School, 76: 104–129. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01052.x
- Issue published online: 21 DEC 2007
- Article first published online: 21 DEC 2007
In this paper we study the effect of different treaty designs on the success of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We analyze the standard assumption of an efficient abatement scheme and three uniform abatement quota schemes. Apart from analytical results, the analysis is supported by simulations based on the STACO (stability of coalitions) model. It turns out that quota agreements where the members decide by majority or unanimity voting are successful in overcoming free-rider incentives within an IEA. Finally, our results provide a rationale for the application of uniform abatement quotas in IEAs.