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R&D PRODUCTIVITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Authors

  • JOANNA POYAGO-THEOTOKY,

    1. La Trobe University, School of Economics and Finance, CRIEFF, University of St Andrews, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA)
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    • Poyago-Theotoky thanks the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation for its financial support (CICYT ECO2008/06191).

  • KHEMARAT TALERNGSRI TEERASUWANNAJAK

    1. Chulalongkorn University
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  • Manuscript received 20.8.10; final version received 7.3.11.

Abstract

We study firms' preferences towards intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in a North–South context, using a simple duopoly model where a ‘North’ and a ‘South’ firm compete in a third market. Unlike other contributions in this field, we explicitly introduce the South's capability to undertake cost-reducing R&D, but maintain the South's inferiority in using and managing its R&D. In contrast to traditional results, we show that the North may encourage lax IPR protection provided that its South rival's R&D productivity is not too low. In this sense, our results do not support the idea of universal or uniform IPR protection regime.

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