• Aristotelian Realism;
  • classes;
  • existence;
  • Goodman;
  • kinds;
  • Levinson;
  • metaphysics;
  • music;
  • ontology;
  • Platonism;
  • types;
  • universals;
  • Wollheim;
  • Wolterstorff

Abstract: In this article, I assume that musical works are abstract types, and I raise and address a new question concerning musical ontology that may take the types view at least a step further: When do musical works cease to exist? I then propound my view about musical works as types, which is somewhat like the Aristotelian Realist position concerning universals. Next, I address some objections to that view. Finally, I provide some grounds for rejecting alternative views that see Western classical musical works before 1950 (the sorts of musical works the discussion here is restricted to) either as classes or else as kinds.