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MORAL PARTICULARISM AND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2008
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00562.x
© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Additional Information
How to Cite
LARVOR, B. (2008), MORAL PARTICULARISM AND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE. Metaphilosophy, 39: 492–507. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00562.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 1 DEC 2008
- Article first published online: 1 DEC 2008
- Abstract
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Keywords:
- ethics;
- moral;
- particularism;
- science;
- mathematics;
- practice
Abstract: Particularism is usually understood as a position in moral philosophy. In fact, it is a view about all reasons, not only moral reasons. Here, I show that particularism is a familiar and controversial position in the philosophy of science and mathematics. I then argue for particularism with respect to scientific and mathematical reasoning. This has a bearing on moral particularism, because if particularism about moral reasons is true, then particularism must be true with respect to reasons of any sort, including mathematical and scientific reasons.