Earlier versions of this paper were read at the Sensation and Perception Seminar, University of Otago, at the Adelaide/Flinders Philosophy Research Seminar, and at the Flinders Medical School Neuroscience Seminar. Thanks to Paul Griffiths, Grant Gillett, Chris Mortensen, John Opie, Robert O'Shea and Albert Yeap for comments on those occasions. A later version was discussed by Stephen Stich and Shaun Nichols in a paper presented at the Theories of Theories of Mind Conference in Sheffield in July 1994 (Nichols et al., 1995). I hope in this version to have deflected at least some of their very trenchant criticisms. Vladimir Popescu made useful suggestions for improvements. Thanks also to Kyle Cave, Jenni Ogden and Lawrence Parsons, and to an anonymous referee for timely clues to the psychological data. All errors, factual and philosophical, are my own responsibility.
Visual Imagery as the Simulation of Vision
Version of Record online: 5 MAY 2007
Mind & Language
Volume 10, Issue 1-2, pages 25–44, March 1995
How to Cite
CURRIE, G. (1995), Visual Imagery as the Simulation of Vision. Mind & Language, 10: 25–44. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00004.x
- Issue online: 5 MAY 2007
- Version of Record online: 5 MAY 2007
Abstract: Simulation Theory says we need not rely exclusively on prepositional knowledge of other minds in order to explain the actions of others. Seeking to know what you will do, I imagine myself in your situation, and see what decision I come up with. I argue that this conception of simulation naturally generalizes: various bits of our mental machine can be run‘off-line’, fulfilling functions other than those they were made for. In particular, I suggest that visual imagery results when the visual system is run off-line. I briefly review the empirical evidence and consider the philosophical implications, particularly concerning the mode of mental representation in imagery.