I would like to thank Stephan McCaffery, as well as two anonymous reviewers, for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
A Defense of De Re Belief Reports
Article first published online: 5 MAY 2007
Mind & Language
Volume 10, Issue 4, pages 446–463, December 1995
How to Cite
REIMER, M. (1995), A Defense of De Re Belief Reports. Mind & Language, 10: 446–463. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00024.x
- Issue published online: 5 MAY 2007
- Article first published online: 5 MAY 2007
Abstract: In Talk About Beliefs, Mark Crimmins claims that de re belief reports are not nearly as common as they are generally thought to be. In the following paper, I take issue with this claim. I begin with a critique of Crimmins’arguments on behalf of the claim, and then follow with an argument on behalf of the opposing claim: that de re belief reports are indeed quite common. In defending this claim, I make some observations about the nature of tacit reference, a phenomenon central to Crimmins’account of belief reports.