This paper is the result of three seminars on Consciousness Explained given at the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, Corpus Christi College, Oxford and Simon Fraser University; it has also been given as numerous talks. I am indebted to all those people who participated in those seminars and to the lively audiences of those talks. In particular, I would like to thank José Bermúdez, Peter Carruthers, Martin Davies, Daniel Dennett, Naomi Eilan, Martin Hahn, Tony Marcel, and Denis Robinson for all their comments and discussions. And I owe special thanks to Joseph Malpeli for his help with the colour phi model.
Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness
Version of Record online: 5 MAY 2007
Mind & Language
Volume 11, Issue 1, pages 1–43, March 1996
How to Cite
AKINS, K. (1996), Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness. Mind & Language, 11: 1–43. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00027.x
- Issue online: 5 MAY 2007
- Version of Record online: 5 MAY 2007
Abstract: In Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett presents the Multiple Drafts Theory of consciousness, a very brief, largely empirical theory of brain function. From these premises, he draws a number of quite radical conclusions—for example, the conclusion that conscious events have no determinate time of occurrence. The problem, as many readers have pointed out, is that there is little discernible route from the empirical premises to the philosophical conclusions. In this article, I try to reconstruct Dennett's argument, providing both the philosophical views behind the empirical premises, and the hidden empirical arguments behind the derivation of the philosophical conclusions.