Thanks to Martin Davies and another referee for comments on an earlier draft.
Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability
Version of Record online: 5 MAY 2007
Mind & Language
Volume 11, Issue 1, pages 44–67, March 1996
How to Cite
HEAL, J. (1996), Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability. Mind & Language, 11: 44–67. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00028.x
- Issue online: 5 MAY 2007
- Version of Record online: 5 MAY 2007
Abstract: Stich, Nichols et al. assert that the process of deriving predictions by simulation must be cognitively impenetrable. Hence, they claim, the occurrence of certain errors in prediction provides empirical evidence against simulation theory. But it is false that simulation-derived prediction must be cognitively impenetrable. Moreover the errors they cite, which are instances of irrationality, are not evidence against the (very defensible) version of simulation theory that takes the central domain of simulation to be intelligible transitions between states with content.