This paper has benifitted from suggestions and comments from Anthony Brueckner and Kevin Falvey, as well as referees from this journal.
Sticking Up for Oedipus: Fodor on Intentional Generalizations and Broad Content
Version of Record online: 5 MAY 2007
Mind & Language
Volume 11, Issue 3, pages 231–245, September 1996
How to Cite
ARJO, D. (1996), Sticking Up for Oedipus: Fodor on Intentional Generalizations and Broad Content. Mind & Language, 11: 231–245. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00044.x
- Issue online: 5 MAY 2007
- Version of Record online: 5 MAY 2007
Abstract: In The Elm and the Expert, Jerry Fodor tries to reconcile three philosophical positions he is presently committed to: a computational theory of mind, intentional realism and a denotational theory of meaning. One problem he faces is this: a denotational semantics, according to which the meaning of a singular term like a name is exhausted by its referent, seems to rule out there being true intentional generalizations, or generalizations which advert to the contents of a subject's mental states. That there are such true generalizations is a major element in Fodor's intentional realism. Accordingly, Fodor is forced to find a way of dissolving this apparent incompatibility. This paper looks at his attempts to do so and concludes that they fail.