Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin


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    Readers who are puzzled by the epigraph should consult p. 17 of Dennett, 1995. All Dennett references are to that volume except as indicated.

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Abstract: Daniel Dennett's book, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, offers a naturalistic teleology and a theory of the intentionality of the mental. Both are grounded in a neo-Darwinian account of evolutionary adaptation. I argue that Dennett's empirical assumptions about the evolution of psychological phenotypes may well be unwarranted; and that, in any event, the intentionality of minds is quite different from, and not reducible to, the intensionality of selection.