Readers who are puzzled by the epigraph should consult p. 17 of Dennett, 1995. All Dennett references are to that volume except as indicated.
Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin
Article first published online: 5 MAY 2007
Mind & Language
Volume 11, Issue 3, pages 246–262, September 1996
How to Cite
FODOR, J. (1996), Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin. Mind & Language, 11: 246–262. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00045.x
- Issue published online: 5 MAY 2007
- Article first published online: 5 MAY 2007
Abstract: Daniel Dennett's book, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, offers a naturalistic teleology and a theory of the intentionality of the mental. Both are grounded in a neo-Darwinian account of evolutionary adaptation. I argue that Dennett's empirical assumptions about the evolution of psychological phenotypes may well be unwarranted; and that, in any event, the intentionality of minds is quite different from, and not reducible to, the intensionality of selection.