Thanks to Larry Shapiro, Gabe Segal and an anonymous reviewer for Mind and Language for helpful remarks on previous drafts and to Norton Nelkin for helpful discussion.
Individualism and Marr's Computational Theory of Vision
Version of Record online: 5 MAY 2007
Mind & Language
Volume 11, Issue 4, pages 313–337, December 1996
How to Cite
BUTLER, K. (1996), Individualism and Marr's Computational Theory of Vision. Mind & Language, 11: 313–337. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00050.x
- Issue online: 5 MAY 2007
- Version of Record online: 5 MAY 2007
Abstract: A great deal of philosophical work has addressed the question of whether Man's computational theory of early vision is individualistic. Burge and Davies have argued that, according to Marr's theory, visual states are individuated non-individualistically. Segal has denied that Marr's theory has these non-individualistic implications. More recently, Shapiro has argued that the entire debate has been misguided. I argue that Shapiro is mistaken in a fairly deep way, attention to which allows us to raise and clarify several important issues involved in discussions of individualism. Contrary to Burge and Davies, and by a route rather different from Segal's, I defend the claim that Man's theory offers no reason to think that visual states are individuated non-individualistically.