Thanks are due to the participants in the conference on metaphor held in London in January 2005, and especially to Robyn Carston. Thanks are due also to two anonymous referees.
The Transparency of Metaphor
Version of Record online: 26 MAY 2006
2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 21, Issue 3, pages 333–359, June 2006
How to Cite
GUTTENPLAN, S. (2006), The Transparency of Metaphor. Mind & Language, 21: 333–359. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00281.x
- Issue online: 26 MAY 2006
- Version of Record online: 26 MAY 2006
Abstract: In the first section of the paper, I set out a tripartite scheme for classifying philosophical accounts of metaphor. In the second and longest section, I explore a major difficulty for certain of these accounts, namely the need to explain what I describe as the ‘transparency’ of metaphor. In the third section, I describe two accounts which can overcome the difficulty. The first is loosely based on Davidson’s treatment of metaphor, and, finding this to be inadequate for reasons having nothing to do with transparency, it will be used solely to show the way. The second is my own, and, without attempting to defend it at length, I will content myself with suggesting how it can cope with the difficulty discussed in this paper in a way which mimics the Davidsonian proposal. Finally, in the fourth section, I shall briefly mention several considerations independent of transparency for adopting my account.